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Global Economy
China and Latin America: Connected and Competing
By Kayla Chen & Xiangming Chen
The Global Rise of China
The rise of  China has stolen more headlines than any other 
global issue these days, stirring up questions about what 
China’s growing prominence really means, and how – more 
than why – it affects the world. While the rise of  previous 
global powers took decades, if  not centuries, China’s rise has 
been spectacularly fast and furious, considering the tremen-
dous economic prowess it has gained over a relatively short 
period of  time. Accounting for approximately 2 percent of  
the world’s total GDP around 1980, China holds almost 15 
percent of  world GDP in purchasing power parity today. 
From a longer historical perspective, however, China has yet 
to regain its dominant status in the world economy back in 
1840 when it accounted for about a third of  world GDP – the 
largest among all countries at the time – before its protracted 
economic decline in the aftermath of  the two Opium Wars.  
As China’s share of  the world economy has grown larger, its 
integration with global trade has also accelerated. According 
to the Chinese government’s statistics,1 China’s share of  global 
trade rose from 4.7 percent in 2002 to 10.2 percent in 2011, 
with its export share of  the global total growing from 5 percent 
to 10.4 percent. This rapid ascent has moved China from 
fourth to first on the list of  top trading nations. With an annual 
growth rate of  21.8 percent since 2002, China moved up from 
being the sixth largest importer in 2002 to the second in 2009, 
and stayed there through 2012, only behind the United States. 
Because China’s speed and intensity of  economic growth and 
global integration over the last three decades is historically 
unprecedented, it is expected to encounter both concerns and 
competition from other emerging economies, mainly in Asia 
and Latin America.
From Old Allies to New Partners
Looking from the 1960s to the present, there has been both 
continuity and change in China’s relations and position with 
other developing countries. As a member of  the old Third 
World camp, China preached and practiced the ideology of  
socialist, independent development with very limited interna-
tional trade. At the same time, China provided development 
assistance to a number of  African and Latin American coun-
tries that shared that ideology, such as Tanzania and Chile, 
whose socialist government under Allende was the first in Latin 
America to recognize China in 1970 (although trade between 
the two countries began as early as 1961). Between 1970 and 
1975, China put up $500 million to build the Tanzania-Zambia 
Railway, the largest single foreign-aid project undertaken by 
China at the time. As part of  this largely ideologically driven 
project, China invited hundreds of  railroad engineers from 
both countries to Beijing for training. The irony at the time 
was that many of  these engineers were the sons of  govern-
ment elites whom China treated as its “socialist brethren.” 
Fast-forward to the first decade of  the 21st century, and 
China has expanded its small and ideologically imbued pres-
ence into considerably larger and market-oriented developing 
economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America. China not only 
has expanded trade and investment ties with many of  these 
economies, but also intensified efforts to target valuable com-
modities like oil, gas, metals and minerals. While continuing 
to provide development assistance, often involving a larger 
amount of  resources to poor developing countries, China has 
become a more powerful trader and investor, with a voracious 
appetite for natural resources that are in short supply at home. 
Relative to its interests in acquiring oil and gas in Central Asia 
and parts of  Africa, China’s economic relations with, and 
interests in, Latin America are more varied and complex. 
The Emerging China-Latin America Nexus 
Trade between China and Latin American countries has 
grown exponentially over the past decade. Although Sino-
Latin American trade continues to remain a relatively small 
share of  their respective global trade, growth has exceeded 
many expectations. From 2000 to 2009, annual trade between 
China and Latin American countries grew more than 1,200 
percent, from $10 billion to $130 billion, according to United 
Nations statistics.2 
China has emerged as the largest export destination for 
Brazil, Chile and Peru and the second largest export destina-
tion for Argentina, Costa Rica and Cuba. Overall trade with 
Latin America is mainly driven by China’s need to fuel its 
expanding economy and to feed its 1.34 billion people. Brazil, 
Chile, Peru and Argentina – more than half  of  the Mercosur 
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group – are tremendously resource-rich. 
For example, agricultural and mining 
goods accounted for 83 percent of  Latin 
American exports to China between 
2008 and 2009.3 Based on a recent World 
Bank assessment of  China’s impact on 
Latin American economies, China’s 
growing demand for South America’s 
leading exports – copper, iron ore, oil 
and soybeans – has had an undeniably 
positive impact on the region’s export 
growth. Nonetheless, growth has been 
quite uneven across different countries 
in Latin America. The Andean and 
Southern Cone nations have reported 
increases ranging from 9 to 14 percent 
of  their total exports, respectively. In 
the case of  Central American products, 
China’s imports accounted for only 
2 percent of  Central America’s total 
exports in 2004.4 
The composition of  Latin America’s 
main exports to China – copper, iron 
ore, oil and soybeans – reflects China’s 
goal to strengthen its “strategic part-
nerships” with Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile, due to the value of  trade and 
their regional influence. Economic ties 
between these countries and China have 
continued to deepen since China became 
Chile’s largest export consumer in 2007 
and Brazil’s largest trading partner in 
2009.5 China’s rapid growth in trade 
and investment in Brazil has helped to 
fuel the Brazilian economy in a sluggish 
global market. Yet, similar to the rest of  
the region, Brazil exports primarily raw 
commodities and imports manufactured 
goods from China. In 2009, 77 percent 
of  Brazil’s exports to China consisted 
of  raw materials, mainly iron ore, soy-
beans and soy oil, while industrial prod-
ucts made up only 23 percent.6 In 2011, 
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff  
remarked, “There is a misbalance on 
our relations with China. Brazil exports 
commodities and imports too many 
knick-knacks. I’m told that 80 percent 
of  this year’s Carnival costumes came 
from China.”7 
Argentina, which maintains a trade 
surplus with China, exported a total 
value of  $5.15 billion to China in 2009.8 
The surplus is mainly driven by its heavy 
export of  soy products. Between 2000 
and 2009, 55 percent of  Argentina’s 
exports to China were soybeans, and 
another 23 percent soy oil.9 Argentina 
has also been a regional leader in forging 
investment and technological coop-
eration with China. The establishment 
of  the Argentine-China debt swap in 
February 2009, worth $10.2 billion, was 
the first such deal in the region. China’s 
investment in private Argentine compa-
nies has also grown. The China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation’s purchase of  
a $3.1 billion interest in Argentina’s 
Bridas, and Sinopec’s $2.4 billion pur-
chase of  Occidental’s Argentine hold-
ings put Argentina on par with Brazil, 
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela with 
respect to China’s investment deals in 
the region.10 Additional areas of  coop-
eration between China and Argentina 
are evident in military and space. 
Argentina is one of  only four Latin 
American countries to have purchased 
military vehicles from China, and one 
of  the few countries to cooperate with 
China in space exploration. Argentina’s 
nuclear agency, CONEA, has also dis-
cussed joint projects with major Chinese 
telecommunications companies such as 
Huawei and ZTE, which have a signifi-
cant presence in Argentina. 
China’s growing economic influ-
ence in Argentina and the region may 
become a concern to the receiving 
parties. However, it will have no real 
impact on the larger and more signifi-
cant reality, which is that the Chinese 
and Latin American economies are 
already strongly connected, and will 
become even more so through this 
decade and beyond. 
Competing from Afar
China’s stronger economic ties with 
Latin America are generating concerns 
in some Latin American countries 
that the Asian superpower is quickly 
outcompeting them. In the short term 
though, China’s demand for raw mate-
rials helps to raise direct exports from 
Latin America. Since Latin American 
countries and China have different 
export structures, the former is not as 
threatened by China’s rapid market 
penetration as assumed, with the clear 
exception of  Mexico.  According to 
Kevin Gallagher, a specialist on interna-
tional economic development, “Mexico 
is the only country in Latin America 
whose comparative advantage has been 
moving in the same direction as the 
comparative advantage of  [India and 
China],” and faces strong commercial 
competition.11 Interestingly though, the 
head-to-head economic competition 
between China and Mexico has shifted 
around to either’s favor in turns.
Once upon a time, Mexico saw 
China as a seemingly unmatchable 
competitor in producing the same kinds 
of  cheap manufactured goods at a frac-
tion of  the cost. Now, for the first time 
in a decade, Latin America’s second 
largest economy has become a credible 
challenger to China in manufacturing. 
According to figures from the United 
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database, Mexico accounted for 12.3 
percent of  all US non-oil imports in 
2010. In 1999, prior to China’s emer-
gence as the “world’s factory,” its share 
was just 10.6 percent.12 The result of  this 
shifting landscape can seem counter-in-
tuitive. Today, Chrysler is using Mexico 
as a base to supply some of  its Fiat 
500s to the Chinese market. To mark 
the company’s $500 million investment 
in Mexico last year, former president, 
Felipe Calderon, remarked, “I think it is 
the first time that a Mexican vehicle, at 
least in recent times, is to be exported to 
China…we always thought it was going 
to be the other way around.”13      
From 2000 to 2009, annual trade between China and Latin 
American countries grew more than 1,200 percent, from $10 
billion to $130 billion, according to United Nations statistics.  
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Other changes have taken place and paved the way for 
Mexico’s new important role as a global manufacturer. Its 
free trade agreements with 44 countries – more than twice 
as many as China, and four times as many as Brazil – have 
allowed companies based in Mexico to source external 
inputs, often duty-free. Another significant shift improv-
ing Mexico’s competitive status is China’s rising labor 
costs. For example, wages in southern China have gone up 
by 20 percent a year over the last four years, and up 14 
percent annually in Shanghai from 2002 to 2009, relative to 
increases of  8 percent in the Philippines and only 1 percent 
in Mexico.14 As a result, Mexican wages, which were 2.4 
times those of  China in 2002, are 14 percent higher now, 
and will be lower than China’s faster rising wages in five 
more years.15 Mexico is clearly back in the game of  labor-
intensive competition with China.
Competing from across the Pacific Ocean for exports to 
the United States, China certainly does not have Mexico’s 
unique geographic advantage as a next-door neighbor. 
According to Lorenza Martínez, Mexico’s Undersecretary 
of  the Economies Ministry, it takes between 20 days and 
two months to ship goods from China to the United States, 
whereas Mexican goods can reach their cross-border destina-
tions between two to seven days. This makes a huge differ-
ence in cost savings and inventory reduction as just-in-time 
manufacturing has become more popular with American 
companies, especially since the 2008 economic recession.16 
Distance matters a great deal to the overall competition 
between China and Mexico for the United States, their most 
important common market. However, it may not be suffi-
cient to offset China’s greater advantages against Mexico 
in its volume of  exports and its spread and depth of  global 
supply chains.
A Win-Win Prospect?
With strong economic ties to multiple Latin American coun-
tries and direct competition with Mexico, China has growing 
interests and stakes in the region today. Does this create the 
impression of  a hegemonic or even colonializing China, like 
that of  the Old World in Latin America? Challenging this 
perception, Jiang Shixue, an influential Chinese scholar on 
Latin America, has portrayed the bilateral relationship as 
South-South cooperation. He cites China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), which constructed a school in the 
city of  Talala, Peru as an example of  China taking up local 
corporate social responsibility.17 One could also point to the 
generally favorable terms of  trade for both sides and China’s 
absence of  political intervention in Latin America as addi-
tional evidence for a mutually beneficial relationship. Against 
this larger picture, China-Mexico’s export competition seems 
to be an outlier.
Moving forward, there may be some uncertainty in Sino-
Latin American relations given the internal and external chal-
lenges surrounding China’s transition to more balanced and 
sustainable economic growth, a more egalitarian society and 
the development of  a more consistent foreign policy. Potential 
slower economic growth will weaken China’s demand for 
commodities from Latin America and reduce the latter’s vul-
nerability to export price volatility, although it will experience 
a slowdown in export growth. Achieving higher levels of  
domestic consumption will lighten China’s burden to compete 
with a country like Mexico for manufactured exports. If  China 
can be convinced to be more flexible regarding territorial dis-
putes (e.g. the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands) and long-distance 
fishing off  South America’s coast, then China could be seen 
by Latin American countries as the “soft power” on the peace-
ful rise that it claims. 
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